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ABSTRACT
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  Japanese labor market institutions have been given substantial credit for 
Japan’s enviable growth performance after World War II. The personnel management 
system – with its strong job protection, enterprise-based unionism, and intensive 
on-the-job training – is especially seen as a factor that allowed Japan to utilize 
imported technology  so rapidly and successfully.  High  levels of  training,  along  with 
group-oriented activities, have also been linked to the high quality of the Japanese 
goods that reached export markets in the 1970s and 1980s.  Indeed, many Japanese 
workplace practices such as quality-control circles have been adopted to good effect 
in the United States and Europe.   On the macroeconomic side, the coordinated but 
decentralized bargaining system is seen as providing for the wage flexibility that 
allowed Japan to adjust to supply shocks, such as the two oil crises, more rapidly 
than most other OECD economies.  Finally, the egalitarian nature of the compensation 
system has been credited with providing the widespread prosperity that underlies 
domestic demand. 
  The prolonged slowdown of the 1990s has led many to question whether the 
institutions that were appropriate for the past are as wholesome for the health of 
the contemporary and future economy. In particular, the rise in the unemployment rate 
since 1998 from around 3% to almost 6% has changed views about the macroeconomic role 
played by the labor market. 
  This disillusionment can be quickly summarized. Strong job protection makes 
it difficult for companies to restructure their activities effectively in response 
to  the  changing  external  environment.  This  means  companies  are  less  likely  to  improve 
their balance sheets. A poorly developed external labor market impedes movement of 
experienced  and  knowledgeable  employees  to  companies  where  they  might  be  more  valuable. 
The government, lacking confidence in the external labor market to absorb the 
unemployed, may have been reluctant to push for more drastic resolution of the bad 
debt problem that hampers the financial system.  Under conditions of weak demand, 
the coordinated bargaining system makes it difficult for employees to increase their 
incomes and thereby may reduce domestic demand. Wage restraint is contributing to 
the deflation that currently is making difficulties for the effective use of monetary 
policy to revive economic growth. The aging of the work force makes it difficult to 
maintain a system where rewards are delayed and provided through promotion. 
  In this paper we address impediments to growth of the labor supply that are 
affecting  the  economy.  Broadly, these are barriers  to inter-firm  mobility for career 
employees,  especially  older  men,  and  the  difficulty  women  face  in  developing 
meaningful careers after taking time off to raise children.  The latter depresses 
the labor force participation of women, especially the middle-aged who have high 
educational attainment.  Both of these issues are closely tied to the Japanese 
personnel management system and the legal framework that supports it. 
  A third impediment to growth on the labor supply side is the reluctance to 
accept large numbers of immigrants into Japan. The outlook is that Japan will continue 
with its existing policies in the short- to medium- run, and we do not consider the 
issue.  We also do not address the way in which the unemployment benefit system may 
induce individuals to remain unemployed, or how retirement benefits may encourage 
earlier retirement.  With respect to the unemployment rate and participation rate 
of those over 60, Japan is doing as well, if not better, at using potential labor 
resources than other OECD countries.  It should be noted that the institutional 
features of the economy that we view as impediments would be significantly less 
problematic if the economy  was growing at the rates seen through the 1980s.  If growth   2
could be restored to 1980s levels through a surge in consumer and investment demand, 
much of the estimated losses to labor input might well be eliminated.  However, that 
is unlikely to happen. 
  In the next section we provide an outline of the state of Japanese labor in 
2001, focusing on the extent to which institutions long seen as characteristic of 
the Japanese labor market have stayed the same or been changing. Next, labor law and 
its consequences are discussed. We then look at impediments to the mobility of career 
employees (primarily men) that may be affecting growth.  Reasons why female labor 
force participation may be lower than levels seen in the United States are then 
examined.  A quantitative perspective of the barriers is presented, including their 
overall implications for economic growth. The role of government policy in removing 
barriers is taken up, and we outline some areas in need of further research. 
 
 
1  The Employment System 
 
Japanese labor markets and institutions have been affected by the slump in growth 
that began in the 1990s, but many of the main features remain largely intact.  Widely 
noted aspects of the “Japanese model” such as enterprise-based unionism, low 
inter-firm mobility, low unemployment, compensation within gender groups that is 
highly determined by age and seniority, large gender gaps in pay and promotions, and 
widespread use of mandatory retirement systems have not dissolved in the face of the 
slowdown, despite press reports. 
 
1.1  Evidence of Only Minor Change 
Evidence that the system has seen only minor change includes the following seven 
points. 
1  Unions remain enterprise based, although union density has fallen steadily 
from around 35% at the time of the first oil shock (1973) to 21% in 2000. 
2  Job tenure for full-time regular employees remains high (Chuma 1997) and may 
even be increasing for some age groups. 
3  Inter-firm mobility rates remain virtually unchanged (Rebick 2000) although 
the number of employees forced to move because of bankruptcies has risen since the 
Asian economic crisis of 1998.   
4  The 5.4% unemployment rate in May 2002, although high by Japanese standards, 
remains lower than the OECD average of 6.9% (OECD standardized rates).  
5  Although performance- and results-related pay are becoming more important 
components of compensation arrangements, there is still a close relationship between 
age (and, to a lesser extent, seniority) and pay.  Japanese age-wage profiles are 
steep mainly because blue-collar workers as well as white-collar workers see large 
increases in pay with age and seniority.  With the exception of the managerial class 
of employees, the variance of pay within age groups remains stable (Genda and Rebick 
2000).  All of this is testimony to the continuing presence of enterprise unions and 
the influence  of  large,  unionized  firms  on  wage-setting  practices  outside  the 
organized sector. 
6  The  gender  pay  gap  has  narrowed  for  full-time  employees  (especially  the  young), 
but  the  gap  in  hourly  pay  between  part-time  female  workers  and  male  full-time  employees 
remains  large.  Because  some  40%  of  women  work  part-time,  the  overall  gender  gap  remains 
large. Among eight OECD countries including Korea, only in Japan is gender – rather   3
than  occupation,  age,  or  industry  –  the  most  important  determinant  of  wages 
(Tachibanaki 1998). 
7  Japan has relatively few women in senior management or director positions 
compared with the United States or United Kingdom. 
 
1.2  Examples of Change 
In spite of these observations, the Japanese model is evolving. Further, most of the 
changes appear to be permanent, rather than temporary accommodations to economic 
conditions or the need for restructuring. 
1  The proportion of individuals who are part-time or contract workers is 
increasing.  In particular the percentage of employees working part-time has been 
rising steadily since the 1960s, reaching highs of 39% of women and 13% of men in 
1999 (OECD 2001).  The number of temporary agency workers remains low at about 1% 
of the work force, but has been increasing rapidly with liberalization of the laws 
regulating agency work. 
2  There has been a decline in the family-based enterprise sector.  Some women 
who would have been family workers, and men who would have become self-employed after 
mandatory retirement, are now in the part-time employee labor force.  Although some 
of this trend may be due to small businesses suffering during the 1990s, much of it 
is due to other aspects of the fundamental restructuring of the economy that is taking 
place. 
3  Managerial compensation is becoming much more sensitive to various measures 
of performance.  This is shown not only by surveys across companies, but also by the 
fact that the variance of pay of middle-aged men with higher education degrees has 
been increasing since the mid 1980s (Genda and Rebick 2000).   
4  Attitudes are changing, especially among young people.  Although the rates 
of separation for young workers have not increased much, most young employees say 
that they expect to change jobs before mandatory retirement. Cohort effects not 
withstanding  (Ohtake  and  Inoki  1997),  young  workers  are  quitting  jobs  at  an  increasing 
rate despite the poor state of the economy.  In 1999, 32% of university graduates 
and 47% of high-school graduates quit their first jobs within three years, both 
increases since 1996 (MOL 1999). 
5  There is an increasing level of part-time work among the young.  Often 
referred  to  as  "freeters,"  they  may  be  finding  it  difficult  to  find  desirable  full-time 
jobs in the current economic climate (Genda 2001).  On the other hand, because of 




2  Worker Protection 
 
The most obvious problem facing companies burdened with redundant workers is the 
difficulty in shedding workers.  There is long-standing agreement between management 
and labor in Japan that allows management to move workers around in the company (or 
even to loan workers to other companies) in return for a guarantee of employment until 
mandatory retirement age (Gordon 1985, 1998).  Since the late 1970s this has been 
altered somewhat: employees might be sent to other companies prior to mandatory 
retirement provided that the guarantee of employment still holds.  In most cases, 
the original company ensures there are no financial losses to those transferred,   4
making supplemental payments to workers if necessary.  Although this is seen as a 
commitment by management to labor, which might be upheld in order to maintain the 
reputation of the employer (and industrial peace), it is reinforced by Japanese case 
law. (The remainder of this section leans heavily on Chuma 1998.) 
  Japanese labor law does not, by statute, provide guarantees of continued 
employment  to  employees,  except  that  employers  must  give  30  days  notice  of  dismissals.  
The  Japanese  constitution, however, enshrines  the  individual's right to work (Article 
27) and the right to a minimum standard of “wholesome and cultured living” (Article 
25).  On this basis, Japanese courts have interpreted the law to impose four main 
standards on employers wishing to dismiss workers. The employer must show that: 
1  It is under severe duress, such as facing possible bankruptcy and redundancies 
are unavoidable. 
2  It has made efforts to avoid redundancies by taking measures such as cutting 
overtime, hiring freezes, transfers, seconding workers to other companies, or 
seeking voluntary retirements. 
3  It has consulted with its labor unions and employees. 
4  It has a rational procedure for selecting those to be dismissed. 
  This case law developed in the 1950s in reaction to the widespread dismissals 
that followed implementation of the disinflationary Dodge Line of 1949-50 and the 
numerous  industrial  disputes  that  followed.  The  courts  were  concerned  about 
dismissals being used as a way of undermining labor union strength, and the four 
conditions  were  aimed  primarily  at  establishing  what  constituted  unfair  labor 
practice under postwar labor laws. The courts also established that redress for 
violation of these principles is not only that the fired worker must be compensated, 
but that the worker must be reinstated with back pay.  Again, this was to act as a 
deterrent to labor practices deemed unfair. 
  The rulings had an effect: in 1975, at the peak of post-oil shock dismissals, 
the proportion of separations that were “at the employer’s will” stood at only 
10%, compared to 21% in 1954, and through the late 1970s firms in general took every 
action to avoid dismissals (Chuma 1998).  The case law was further strengthened 
through rulings in the late 1970s, at a time when a number of court cases examined 
dismissals for the purpose of labor adjustment during the downturn of the mid 1970s.  
In  the  1970s  and  after,  protection  of  workers  from  dismissals  was  extended  to  temporary 
and fixed-contract workers who had been repeatedly rehired after their contract 
expired and even to workers in the first, probationary year of employment. 
  Until 1998 the Labor Standards Law limited fixed-term contracts to one year 
or less. This was intended to force employers to offer indefinite-period contracts 
to employees. After the 1998 revision, the law allows contracts of up to three years, 
but only in the case where the employee is over 60, or is in a specialized occupation, 
or under other restricted circumstances determined by the Ministry of Health, Labor 
and Welfare (MHLW).  Further, such a contract is not renewable, except for one year 
(Yamakawa  1998).  This is  a  considerable restriction,  and  has  been heavily criticized 
(Ohtake 2001, Yashiro 1999).Since 1999 there have been a number of court rulings that 
have relaxed and even, in at least one case, dispensed with the framework of the four 
conditions, but it is still too early to know what overall effect these rulings will 
have (Yamakawa and Araki 2001). 
 
2.1  Consequences 
One problem with the level of job protection provided by dismissal case law has been   5
the reluctance of employers to hire employees that they are not sure they wish to 
keep indefinitely. There also are negative externalities (Yashiro 1999). We later 
deal with one of the more serious of these: the lack of a well-developed external 
labor market and the information problems that result. 
  Another effect of current law is that it encourages companies to seek 
government help in the form of subsidies, protection from competition, and protection 
from creditors.  Although labor case law was not responsible for this action, it is 
part of a general approach that provides economic security through employers rather 
than directly from the state or private insurance provision (Noguchi 1995).  This 
may come at the expense of growth in total factor productivity.  For example, Hayashi 
and  Prescott  (2002)  note  that  TFP  growth  was  exceptionally  low  at  0.8%  per  annum  during 
1978-83 when the government took action to subsidize and otherwise support industries 
that were in need of restructuring and firms endeavored to avoid dismissals.   
  Although arguments can be made for worker protection from the viewpoint of 
economic efficiency, there is little rationale for imposing a penalty whereby workers 
must be reinstated with back pay.  Chuma (1998) argues that it would be better to 
simply impose a cash penalty that employers should pay workers who have  been  dismissed 
in violation of the conditions. He also suggests that courts may not be in the best 
position to evaluate the financial concerns of the company and that if the "severe 
duress" condition is imposed too stringently it may compromise the survival of the 
firm over the long run. 
  If a firm can no longer produce competitively, its human capital may have 
lost value regardless of what the firm is paying  the employee.  The benefits  of worker 
protection may be quickly outweighed by the costs when there is a widespread drop 
in the value of some kinds of firm-specific human-capital. 
 
 
3  Barriers to Mobility Between Firms 
 
There are many barriers to mobility in the Japanese labor market.  Table 1 gives us 
some indication of the problems from the point of view of employees, based on a survey 
by Recruit, an employment service. Here, individuals who wanted to change jobs were 
asked why they found it difficult to do so. Of course, there also are corresponding 
issues on the employer side of the labor market. We analyze all of these beginning 
with  information problems, skill mismatch, and lack  of pension portability.  Seniority 
pay and age-based discrimination are then taken up, followed by differentials in pay 
by firm size and egalitarian pay norms. Job protection, the result of both law and 
firms' employment practices, is analyzed as a cause of both excess workers within 
firms and skill mismatch. 
  
3.1  Information Problems 
A long-standing problem in the Japanese labor market concerns the lack of available 
employment information.  Commonly, workers do not know exactly (in terms of quality 
or quantity) what skills they have, and employers are unclear about the skills they 
need.  That is, there has been a symmetric lack of information, and this is almost 
certainly due to the poor development of the external labor market in an economy with 
overall low mobility.  “Better information for job seekers” has been a recurrent 
slogan in a situation where job postings tend to be ambiguous and crucial information 
such as job description and required skills are lacking (JIL 1998).   6
  Employment information can be categorized into extensive information, which 
consists of information available to all job-seekers such as firm size and wages, 
and intensive information, which is more likely to be insider in nature such as work 
norms  and  work  atmosphere  of  the  employer  (Rees  1966).    Access  to  intensive 
information is a benefit insofar as it improves the quality of the job match, and 
subsequently leads to higher rewards and better job satisfaction (Granovetter 1974, 
reporting a study of white-collar males in Boston).  Watanabe (1992) explains that 
workers are more likely to obtain intensive information through acquaintances or 
former employers.  According to Recruit's 2001 survey, 41% of job seekers gathered 
employment  information  through  “contacts  with  friends,  family  and  former  employers” 
and 72% of those found jobs through this channel (equal to 30% of all those who found 
jobs). In Granovetter's study, 56% used contacts. 
  A labor market that favors informal job-search methods disfavors job-seekers 
who are not endowed with network ties or otherwise must seek re-employment through 
formal  means.    Workers  seeking  employment  through  direct  applications  through 
employment agencies experience considerable hardship. This includes longer duration 
of job-search and a poor quality of match (JIL 1998). This is not a problem peculiar 
to Japan. 
  In a society where a market for job-changers is only just evolving and 
one-fifth of worker surveyed said they “do not know how to look for jobs” it is 
not surprising that firms specialized in headhunting and re-employment services are 
growing rapidly.  Human resource firms are focusing on the information mismatch 
between buyers and sellers of labor.  Their services include helping employers grasp 
which skills are needed, and helping job-seekers identify what types of skills they 
have and the options available to them.  The government is gradually deregulating 
the market for private employment services, including temporary employment agencies, 
through revision of the Dispatched Employees Law. All this may lead to improvement. 
  Access to privileged information from social networks may not be limited to 
employment information.  The quantity and quality of social resources are determined 
not only by the breadth and depth of an individual’s network of acquaintances, but 
also by virtue of belonging to a particular organization.  Establishing important 
connections with business partners, and gaining trust and reputation within the firm, 
are important forms of social resources that workers acquire through their jobs.  
However, in most cases, such resources are lost if a worker relocates to a different 
establishment.  Social resources acquired through business can be a benefit that 
facilitates workers’ upward mobility within firms, but it can also be an impediment 
to inter-firm mobility as workers fear that they “will lose personal contacts 
established through work.” 
 
3.2  Skill Mismatch 
Skill mismatch is a problem related to information availability, and it is of 
increasing concern in Japan.  A survey of OECD economies reports that the Beveridge 
curve (which graphs unemployment rates against vacancies) has been shifting outward 
in Japan since the 1970s (Nickell and others 2001) and this trend has clearly 
accelerated in the late 1990s (Genda and Rebick 2000). This implies more jobs are 
available  for  any  given  unemployment  rate,  and  that  suggests  there  may  be  an  increasing 
mismatch of skills. A survey of businesses and job seekers found that the level of 
vacancies (690,000) and applicants (740,000) across 60 occupational categories were 
fairly close, but within categories the the ratio of vacancies to applicants ranged   7
from 9.95 to 0.05 (METI-Recruit 2001). 
  A lack of necessary qualifications of job applicants, especially in some of 
the more specialized occupations such as IT-related work, also is highlighted in the 
METI-Recruit study.  It is clear information flows must be improved in several ways.  
Firms need to convey to those who provide training just what skills they need, and 
that information must also reach those seeking training or needing it as a result 
of  being  laid-off.  Outplacement  departments  could  do  a  better  job  as  regards  the  latter. 
Public funds for retraining are offered to both companies and individuals, are and 
there proposals to increase the levels. 
 
3.3  Lack of Pension Portability 
Closely related to the problem of seniority-based pay (taken up later) is the lack 
of portability of private, firm-based pensions.  Japan implemented the equivalent 
of the US 401(k)-type defined-contribution plans in October 2001.  Prior to this, 
there were no tax advantages to saving outside of the defined-benefit plans offered 
by firms. 
  Firm-based pensions take a number of different forms and can make lump-sum 
payments or provide annuities after retirement, but they share the characteristics 
of offering benefits based on years of service and final base salary.  A recipient 
with 35 years tenure typically gets two to four years of base pay (that is, not 
including semi-annual bonuses), with the higher rates going to the better-educated 
employees of large firms (MOL 2000b).  Portability problems arise because payouts 
often are reduced more than proportionately if an employee leaves before mandatory 
retirement.  At the same time, an individual with low tenure at mandatory retirement 
(due  to  switching  firms)  may  suffer  from  a  more  than  proportional  reduction  in  benefits.  
In other words,  the  likely losses  in  earnings  from a move  extend to  losses in  pensions.   
  Ichinose (2001) uses pension tables to compute the pension losses that would 
be experienced by individuals who leave a large firm (more than 1000 employees) and 
move to a smaller firm at lower pay, which is the most common pattern.  The losses 
are computed assuming that an individual is paid the average for the firm size and 
according to tenure.  Pension losses can amount to ¥10 million to ¥20 million from 
an average pension of ¥35 million, depending on age at separation.  The younger the 
age, the greater the loss.  For this reason, firms, especially large firms, offer 
additional lump-sum payments to individuals who leave under early retirement plans.  
The additional payments – typically between ¥5 million and ¥10 million – cover some, 
but not all of the losses in pension value.  In comparison to the overall losses of 
up to ¥100 million that may be realized by workers who lose their jobs at large firms 
at age 40, these are not large quantities, but as suggested by the responses in Table 
1, have some influence on behavior. 
 
 
4  Seniority and Pay Structure 
 
There are significant tenure effects on earnings from seniority in the Japanese 
workplace.  The work of Koike (1988), Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) and Mincer and 
Higuchi (1988) drew attention to the importance of on-the-job training and the 
development of firm-specific human capital for Japanese men.  Along with the case 
studies and direct surveys of Koike, the latter two papers highlighted the apparently 
large increase in earnings with tenure (seniority) in Japan compared to the United   8
States. 
  Work by Ohtake (1998) and others using cross-section microdata has, however, 
modified this view substantially.  First, Ohtake finds that the return to tenure was 
smaller than had earlier been reported, even in the past.  Second, he shows that the 
returns to tenure fell between 1980 and 1992, while rising in the United States.  The 
cross-sectional data suggest that the increase in earnings attributable to tenure 
is 1% to 2% per year in Japan, still somewhat higher than in the United States.  This 
is mainly, but not entirely, due to the fact that seniority has a much larger effect 
on the earnings of Japanese blue-collar workers than their US counterparts.   
  Although there may well be an explanation in terms of firm-specific human 
capital to support the high returns to tenure in Japan, there are other views of this 
pattern that suggest that it may be a compensation policy developed in the 1920s and 
strengthened in the immediate postwar period to motivate workers and to provide for 
basic  needs.  In  this  view,  the  returns  to  seniority  can  be  reduced  through  managerial 
reform without having any adverse effect on productivity, if pay-for-performance 
systems are introduced.  This seems to be what is taking place, albeit at a slow pace 
(Rebick 2001).  If the returns to seniority were further reduced, this should 
naturally raise the rate of mobility and also lessen the motivation of the courts 
to maintain such high standards of legal protection. Some of the arguments used by 
the courts have made reference to the need for worker protection given the nature 
of the Japanese employment system, including the pay accorded to seniority (Chuma 
1998). 
What makes the tenure effect so important for Japan, is that average tenure 
is higher in Japan than in most other OECD countries for all age categories, Italy 
being a notable exception.  As a result, middle-aged Japanese employees stand to lose 
more by leaving their firm than their counterparts in most other countries.  This 
is particularly important for the higher-paid employees of large Japanese firms who 
have almost double the median tenure of those in smaller firms (Ohtake 1998, Table 
4.7).  The losses in earnings experienced by workers who leave firms after many years 
have an effect on mobility because they will increase resistance to the employer by 
unions or workers who know they have the support of the legal system. 
 
4.1  Age-Based Discrimination 
A  consequence  of  the  long-term  employment  and  seniority  systems  is  that  Japanese  firms 
impose age limits when recruiting and hiring.  Workers exceeding the age limit of 
the jobs posted continues to be the most common reason for workers not changing jobs 
(Recruit 2001a, JIL 2001c). For this reason, here we pay special attention to the 
overt age-based discrimination in Japan's labor market. 
  Over 90% of Japanese firms impose age restrictions, generally 35 to 40, on 
their job openings. There is little variation across industry, firm size, and city 
size (JIL 2001a).  There are many reasons why firms impose age limits, but they 
primarily concern how older workers do not fit into the firm’s current employment 
system (Table 2).  These reasons make sense in light of the previous discussion.  
Because of the prevailing norm of long-term employment, there is still a stigma 
attached to older or mid-career job seekers and firms often view them as “hard to 
handle” or as “unable to adapt well to the corporate culture.”  It is also likely 
that many individuals who have lost jobs in other companies are simply not as able, 
so a potential employers’ view that they don't adapt well applied in their former 
company.  The hesitancy to hire mid-career workers is partly rooted in the notion   9
of equity.  Indeed, from Table 2 we can infer that the reason for age restrictions 
is less because of the “relative ease of hiring young workers” and more because 
“older workers do not mix well with younger workers” or “to avoid exceeding the 
age structure of previous hires.” 
  Under  pressure for reform, “guidelines”  to abolish age limits in  recruiting 
and hiring were introduced in October 2001 as part of the revised Employment Measures 
Law.  However, the guidelines specify 10 cases or exceptions where limits are 
acceptable.  One exception is phrased almost specifically to prevent disruptions in 
the seniority system: "(4) Cases where recruiting or hiring is intended for workers 
under a certain age in situations where, in order to make wage payments regardless 
of age to new employees, companies will be required to revise present regulations 
determining wages mainly in accordance with age (JIL 2001c)." 
  As  it  stands,  the  guidelines  are  viewed  mainly  as  a  cosmetic  gesture;  it  simply 
states that employers should make efforts to abolish age limits.  Unlike some 
countries, the Japanese guidelines do not impose any penalty for violations.  A 
cursory glance at job postings after the guidelines went into effect confirms that 
the  vast  majority  continue  to  have  age  limits.  (See,  for  example, 
[employment.yahoo.co.jp/].)  It is thus questionable whether they will have any 
effective results in the foreseeable future. The experience of other countries 
suggests that the problem will not go away even if the law is imposed with greater 
force.  The high levels of tenure held by Japanese workers, especially in large 
companies, mean that their losses of both earnings and specific capital are likely 
to present them with even greater problems than their counterparts elsewhere. 
 
 
5  Firm-size Differentials and Egalitarian Pay Norms 
 
An important stylized fact about mobility in Japan is that employees tend to move 
to smaller firms.  In 1997 there were 1,670,000 employees who switched firms, and 
by definition separations equaled accessions (Employment Trends Survey 1998, Table 
10).  If we restrict attention to firms with more than 1000 employees, there were 
192,000 separations involving inter-firm moves, but only 172,000 accessions.  The 
main source of this “mobility deficit” for large firms is found in the 50 and over 
age groups. One reason for this distorted mobility pattern may be found in the 
egalitarian pay norms (described in the next section) and the presence of firm-size 
pay differentials.  
  Smaller firms pay substantially lower wages than larger ones, even after 
differences in worker attributes are taken into account (Tachibanaki and Ohta 1994; 
Rebick 1992).  The reasons small firms pay less are not completely understood. 
Whatever they are, it is unlikely that the underlying causes, many of which are rooted 
in Japan’s industrial organization, will change over the short- or medium- term.  
As we explain in the next section, the lower average pay levels found in smaller firms 
make them more likely to hire older employees. 
 
5.1  Maintaining "Fairness" 
Baron (1988) emphasizes the role of peer groups and normative comparisons in shaping 
worker assessments of fairness, and explains that worker perceptions of fairness 
concerning output and rewards are governed more by social comparison when there is 
greater  homogeneity  among  workers.    He  explains  that  work  force  homogeneity   10
“facilitates identification with peers and co-workers, and that such homogeneity 
(is noted to be) greater in Japanese than US facilities” (p 516).  Under a system 
where wages and promotion are determined primarily by age and seniority, careful 
measures are taken to ensure that workers are promoted in accordance with seniority, 
and that deviations from the main career track are minimized.  Promotion rates among 
Japanese establishments do vary  across time, firm-size,  industry sector,  and sectoral 
output growth (Ariga, Brunello and Ohkusa 2000). However, Japan-US comparisons have 
consistently  shown  that  the  variance  in  wages  among  Japanese  organizations  are  smaller 
than their US counterparts (see, for example, Kalleberg and Lincoln 1988). 
  Bringing older workers into the work force disrupts the seniority structure, 
and  hence  the  wage  structure,  because  the  employment  system  presumes  entry  from  below. 
This is a reason why introduction of pay-for-performance systems that really deliver 
high variance in outcomes has been so slow.  The preference for egalitarian pay in 
the presence of pay systems that have a strong age-consciousness means that firms 
often  feel  that  it  is  necessary  to  pay  mid-career  hires  as  if  they  had  similar  seniority 
to those of the same age in the firm.  For example, a survey of 13,000 establishments 
(MOL 2000a) indicates that in the majority of firms surveyed, new employees are in 
principle paid approximately the same as existing employees of the same age and 
occupation.  Only 15% indicated that they would pay the new hires less than their 
age cohort, presumably because they lacked firm-specific experience.  Since much of 
the value of older employees may be firm-specific, they are much less valuable after 
changing firms.  It is easier for smaller firms, with lower average pay levels to 
fit these employees into their pay structure in a way that does not violate the 
egalitarian norms  of the  firm.  This  is  one  of  the  reasons  why we  see  a  marked  tendency 
for older employees to move to smaller firms. Exceptionally able or skilled employees 
may stay in the large firm sector or move up to larger firms but, on average, employees 
tend to move down the firm-size hierarchy. 
  What we wish to emphasize is that it is the combination of seniority- and 
age- related pay, preference for egalitarian pay for similar age groups, and the 
firm-size differential that distort the pattern of inter-firm mobility in Japan.  In 
particular, this means that the kinds of jobs that are available to older men in Japan 
will be severely restricted.  This in turn makes it more difficult for larger firms 
to dismiss their employees. 
 
 
6  Female Labor Force Participation 
 
This section provides an overview of women's involvement in the Japanese labor force. 
Following sections analyze specific barriers that have made that involvement less 
than it might be. These are exclusion from firms' internal labor markets and various 
aspects of the pension and benefit systems. Initiatives to reconcile work and family 
life are also taken up. 
  Table 3 shows female labor force participation rates and the rates of 
part-time  work  for  women  in  Japan  and  elsewhere  in  the  OECD.  It  is  clear  that  Japanese 
women, while not having the lowest rate of overall participation, are far from having 
the highest.  There is therefore room for Japan to increase its labor inputs from 
this source.  Further, Japanese women are more likely to work part-time (defined as 
less than 35 hours per week) than most of their counterparts elsewhere.  There are 
a number of reasons why these situations exist.   11
  Women  are  more  likely  to  exit  the  labor  force  for  child-rearing  or  other  family 
responsibilities and later return to the labor force.  This exit and re-entry results 
in the M-curve pattern of labor force participation rates.  The M-curve has flattened 
since the early 1990s but as Figure 1 shows, the mass exit of women in their 30s 
continues to be a pronounced pattern in international comparisons. 
  However, the proportion of women who want to work but cannot also is highest 
among  the  30s  age  group.  When  this  proportion  is  included  in  the  actual  participation 
rates, we obtain a curve that resembles Western counterparts.  This curve, known as 
the  potential  participation  rate curve,  has  received considerable  attention  in policy 
circles  concerned  with Japanese  women’s requirements  for  reconciling  work and family 
life.  The  potential  participation  rates  provide  an  upper  bound  of  the  number  of  women 
who could be employed under conditions where various institutional barriers have been 
removed. For example, Osawa (1998), citing results from the 1992 National Survey on 
Lifestyle Preferences, reports that actual participation will resemble potential 
participation if the proportion of women who would work under conditions of reliable 
child care facilities are included. 
  Another feature concerns the growth in part-time employment.  As Figure 2 
shows, the proportion of women in regular employment has changed little since 1965.  
However,  there  has  been  a  remarkable  transition  from  the  informal  sector 
(self-employed and family workers) to part-time employment. This is attributable 
mainly to changes in industrial structure: a decline in agricultural employment and 
family-run work, a rise in work opportunities in firms (Nagase 1997), and a relative 
improvement of female wages (Shimada and Higuchi 1985).  
  Women’s working patterns  are  better  understood by first accounting  for  their 
non-market activities.  Although expectations and attitudes concerning traditional 
gender division of labor are declining, Japanese women still face pressure to remain 
as full-time mothers for children under school age, and must maintain flexible work 
patterns to accommodate their non-market responsibilities.  The Japanese government 
is attempting to change this situation through measures such as the New Angel Plan, 
which includes expansion of child care arrangements (MHLW 2001, p 248-51). 
  Compounding these supply-side problems are demand-side impediments such as 
the  difficulty  women  face  in  being  hired  into  the  internal  labor  market,  and 
disincentives  stemming  from  the  unintended  consequences  in  the  tax  and  benefit  system. 
 
 
7  Exclusion from Internal Labor Market 
 
Both men and women face problems if they change firms or leave the labor market for 
a time. Women are far more likely to temporarily leave the labor force.  Japanese 
firms, especially the more desirable employers, typically create an internal labor 
market. This involves extensive training within the firm that presumes a long-term 
relationship between workers and employers.  Employers thus seek workers who plan 
to remain with the firm over a long period, so that the costs of their investments 
will not be lost.  Because women are more likely to exit for reasons of marriage or 
child-rearing,  they  face  statistical  discrimination  (see,  for  example,  Brinton  1989).  
High-status  positions  in  the  seniority  system  are  awarded  to  workers  with 
long-standing tenure, so few women reach the upper echelons. Moreover, although 
Japanese women may enter large firms in equal proportions to men, only a very small 
proportion of the women even enter career-track positions.  It is not that there has   12
been a "glass ceiling" in Japan, it is that there has not even been a ladder. 
  The  common  route  for  women  is  to  re-enter  the  labor  force  as  part-time  workers.  
Women who re-enter the market tend to find employment in smaller firms.  In fact, 
Saso (1990) explains that older Japanese women are much more concentrated than young 
women in small firms and unskilled blue-collar occupations.  Better educated married 
women with children are more likely to remain non-participants, other things equal.  
This may be because the available jobs are not interesting or otherwise attractive 
to such women, who may prefer to develop non-market (leisure) activities. 
  Using census data for Japan and the United States, Brinton and Ngo (1993) 
estimate the index of gender segregation for the two countries in two occupational 
categories  –  managers  and  administrators,  and  unskilled  blue-collars.  They  find  that 
among  managers  and  administrators  segregation  is  greater  in  Japan,  and  the  segregation 
is greater among older age groups in Japan, while it remains stable across all age 
groups in the US.  Among unskilled blue-collar occupations, segregation is greater 
in the United States, and it decreases with age in Japan, while it increases with 
age in the US. 
  These  findings  are  consistent  with  the  M-curve  pattern  of  labor  force 
participation among Japanese women.  The likelihood of their placement into the 
internal labor market at the port of entry is lower than men’s, but their attrition 
rate  is  even  greater,  as  large numbers of  women exit the labor force for  family  duties.  
When they re-enter, they do so into unskilled occupations.  This pattern of labor 
mobility results in higher gender segregation among management occupations and lower 
gender segregation among unskilled occupations for older workers. 
 
 
8  Tax and Benefit Systems 
 
The structure of tax and benefit schemes distorts the labor supply behavior  of  married 
women in part-time employment.  For example, second earned income are treated in such 
a way that the after-tax income of some households may actually decline if the second 
income exceeds the limit (usually around ¥1 million per year). (Tax exempt status 
and pension benefits for spouses are not gender specific in Japan but, as we are 
analyzing  their  impact  on  married  women  in  general  and  those  who  are  not  their  family's 
primary wage earner in particular, we refer only to women.) 
  In general, the schemes originally were introduced to protect married women 
from declines in household income when they moved from market work to household work.  
However,  because  they  rest  on  the  implicit  assumption  that  married  women  should  remain 
as full-time housewives, the unintended consequences of such “policies to protect 
full-time  housewives”  (Higuchi  1995)  have  come  under  severe  scrutiny  amidst 
increasingly diversifying patterns of women’s employment. There is strong evidence 
that women in Japan adjust employment hours and annual income so as not to exceed 
the critical exemption levels. (Horioka 1999). 
  As a good basis for discussion, Table 4 presents 1990 and 2001 surveys that 
examine how employment patterns of married women in part-time positions are affected 
by taxes and benefits.  An increasing number of respondents - 36% in 1990 and 49% 
in 2001 - adjusted their employment level in response to these policies.  Moreover, 
70 percent of the wives of salaried workers responded that they will increase their 
work hours if these policies were removed. (National Survey on Lifestyle Preferences, 
cited in Nagase 2001).  Clearly, the proportion of women who withhold labor as a   13
consequence of such policies is not negligible. 
  The following discussion focuses on three factors – the tax exempt status 
of spouses, social security programs, and fringe benefits provided by employers – 
and examines how they may constitute disincentives to married women’s employment.  
A noteworthy pattern observed across the three factors is that the adjustments in 
labor supply are more pronounced among educated women (Abe and Ohtake 1997, Higuchi 
1995).    There  are  three  principal  explanations  for  this.  First,  education  is 
positively correlated with wages, so higher-educated women reach the critical level 
of earnings more quickly than lower-educated women. Second, higher-educated women 
have better knowledge of the lower and upper bounds of various exemptions and respond 
more sensitively. Three, wives’ education is positively correlated with husbands’ 
education  (hence  higher  husbands’  earnings),  so  they  may  have  less  incentive  to  work.  
Whatever the reasons, such an incentive structure depresses the rate of return to 
education for women, and discourages the younger generation of women from pursuing 
higher education. 
 
8.1  Tax Code 
The income tax code in Japan has undergone several revisions in the postwar period.  
The 1950 revision introduced a system that placed the tax burden on individual income 
instead of household income.  However, because the per capita disposable income of 
a  household  declines  as  the  number  of  dependents  increases,  the  system  also  introduced 
exemptions for part of spousal income.  In the latest version, introduced in 1988, 
spouse’s income was tax exempt up to ¥700,000 annually, after which for each ¥50,000 
incremental increase in income, the exemption decreased ¥50,000, so the exemption 
became zero at ¥1.4 million.  This was an improvement compared to its predecessor 
because it eliminates kinks or discontinuities in (after-tax) household budgets. 
Still, even with the revisions, the marginal tax rate for households is higher when 
the spouse’s income is between ¥1 million and ¥1.35 million, than when it is over 
¥1.35 million. 
  Using the General Survey on Part-time Workers Conditions, Abe and Ohtake 
(1997) examine the labor force participation rates of married women in part-time 
positions as a function of their annual earnings and show that the distribution is 
concentrated around the ¥1 million mark, with a significant drop in participation 
for earnings over that. Nagase (2001) shows similar results using monthly income (not 
annual income).  Abe and Ohtake further show that the distribution of work-hours 
becomes  a  bimodal  distribution  when  adjusted  for  hourly  wages,  with  spikes 
concentrated around the hours where the budget constraints are discontinuous.  An 
increase in wages implies that workers reach the ceiling more quickly, so the 
consequence is that workers work less hours.  Put differently, there is no incentive 
for married women to increase their supply of labor under the current system (Osawa 
1993). 
  There also is ample evidence that non-convexities in the household budget 
distort  the  labor  supply  of  women.  Higuchi  (1995)  and  Osawa  (1993)  present  theoretical 
discussion of the impact of tax exemption schemes on women’s labor supply, before 
and after the revision of 1988.  
 
8.2  Benefits and Pensions 
Features of the social security system have been criticized for causing distortions 
in the labor supply of women.  Under the current system, contributions to health   14
insurance and public pensions are exempt for spouses provided employment hours do 
not exceed 75% of hours worked by regular full-time workers and annual income does 
not exceed ¥1.3 million.  (The physically challenged and workers over 60 can earn 
¥1.8 million.) In addition, contributions to unemployment insurance are not required 
of a spouse with an annual income less than ¥900,000 who works less than 20 hours 
per week.  Hatta and Kimura (1993) argue that the current pension system clearly 
favors  households  with  full-time  housewives,  and  that  the  removal  of  such  “artificial 
barriers”  to  women’s  employment  will  encourage  more  women  to  seek  full-time 
employment.  The  rise  in  regular  employment  will  increase  the  base  of  pension  payments 
and subsequently alleviate the current imbalance between payments and receipts in 
the pension system. 
  The labor supply of married women is further constrained by the fringe 
benefits provided by their husband’s companies.  Abe and Ohtake (1997) suggest this 
is the most important barrier to married women earning more than ¥1 million per year. 
Higuchi (1995) reports that over 80% of Japanese companies provide fringe benefits 
for employee  dependents  (such  as  special  benefits  for  families  and  children), 
averaging ¥9300 per month in 1992, but 60% of the companies will terminate benefits 
if spousal income exceeds a certain level, usually around ¥1 million. The value of 
the benefit may not be substantial sum, but it affects the employment of 12% to 16% 
of married women (Table 4). 
 
 
9  Initiatives to Reconcile Work and Family Life 
 
Under  the  Child  Care  Leave  and  Family  Care  Leave  Law,  child  care  leave  became  mandatory 
for enterprises with more than 30 employees, and family care leave became mandatory 
for all enterprises.  Employees receive 25% of their wages while on leave.  Despite 
this, a mere 0.6% of male workers took child care leave following the birth of a child 
(MOL  1997).  The  vast  majority  who  take  leave  are  women.  Some  70%  of  women  quit  instead 
of taking maternity leave, citing reasons such as “it was not the right climate at 
work” (from the 1996 National Survey on Family Planning, cited in Breslin 1997.) 
  Companies that have re-employment schemes, where former employees are hired 
back,  receive  subsidies  to  facilitate  re-employment  of  women.    The  system  is 
beneficial to both workers and employers insofar as it allows recovery of previous 
investment in employer-specific skills (Imada 1998).  However, the proportion of 
companies that have the system stood at just 21% in 1996.  Moreover, the system is 
subject to numerous terms and conditions.  For example, only 14% of these firms will 
re-employ their returnees as regular employees. In short, the current system does 
not offer particularly promising prospects for women who seek re-employment. 
  The presence of small children dramatically reduces Japanese women’s labor 
supply (Hill 1989; Nagase 1997; Ogawa and Ermisch 1996), to a degree beyond that 
witnessed in Western societies. For example, Tusya, Bumpass. and Choe (2000) show 
that the percentage of wives employed among households with preschool age children 
is 37% in Japan and 58% in the United States.  Studies have shown that maternity leave 
policies and access to child care facilities increase women’s job continuity (with 
the same employer) or re-entry into the labor force (Nakamura and Ueda 1998).  In 
particular, Higuchi, Abe, and Waldfogel (1997) show that child care leave had a 
positive and significant effect on married-woman job continuity in Japan, the United 
States, and United Kingdom, but the marginal effect was found to be largest in Japan.    15
Although the number of women who take advantage of child care leave may be small, 
the authors argue that their findings are encouraging.  They conclude that what is 
required is not only for companies to install child care policies, but to ensure an 
environment that allows workers to take advantage of such policies. 
  In  response  to  growing  worker  demands,  some  Japanese  companies  have 
introduced “family-friendly” policies, or measures that help employees reconcile 
the  claims  of  work  and  family  life  (Sato  2000).  Flexible  working  schedules,  subsidies 
for the costs of family care, and provision of child care facilities in the workplace 
are common forms of these policies.  The policies are a private initiative, but the 
MHLW has set up a system of “awards for family-friendly firms” to encourage their 
spread.  The need for such policies is a high-priority issue in light of the changing 
values among Japanese workers.  Survey results show that the proportion of men and 
women who support the traditional gender division of labor is rapidly decreasing, 
while the proportion of men and women who desire a balance between family and work 
is increasing. (Consider, for example, the 1999 NHK survey cited in Sato 2000.) 
  However, the implementation of family-friendly policies in Japanese firms 
remains limited.  A Ministry of Labor survey in 1997 found that 51% of Japanese firms 
had no family-friendly policies apart from the legal requirements. The survey found 
great variation over firm size and industry, with large firms not surprisingly doing 
the  most.    Close  to  100%  of  establishments  with  more  than  500  employees  had 
family-friendly policies of some kind, averaging 11.7 policies in place (out of a 
possible 24) versus 44% and 3 policies among establishments with fewer than 30 
employees. By industry, over 95% of firms in finance and insurance had policies, 
averaging 7.8, while in construction it was just  40% and 1.5 policies (1996 Survey 
on Women Workers’ Employment Management, cited in Sato 2000). 
  A common way for Japanese families to reconcile work and family life is to 
depend  on  extended  family:  that  is,  their  children's  grandparents  (Morgan  and  Hirosima 
1983).  Empirical studies have found that co-residence with grandparents greatly 
increases the probability of women’s entry into regular employment (Nagase 1997), 
and increases employment hours (Tsuya, Bumpass, and Choe 2000).  However, it should 
be noted that the proportion of elderly in need of care is increasing, and the burden 
of  care  will  likely  fall  on  women  (Ogawa  and  Ermisch  1996,  Osawa  1990).  Hence,  reliance 
on grandparents to support women’s work-lives cannot be a long-term solution. 
 
 
10  Quantifying the Barriers 
 
Our approach to understanding the extent to which problems in the labor market are 
affecting economic growth is based on simple growth accounting and looks at the medium 
term.  We look for unutilized (or under-utilized) labor assets and assume that they 
can be moved into production evenly over a given period.  This lets us know how much 
the potential growth of the labor input could be altered if the impediments to the 
supply of this labor were removed.  The resulting figure can then be multiplied by 
labor’s share of national output (roughly 70% in the Japanese case) to yield a 
potential  increase  in  output  to  the  economy.  This  contribution  is  a  one-time  increase 
but, for a fixed period, represents an increase in the potential growth rate.  The 
calculation is necessarily crude, and depends a lot on the assumptions behind the 
estimates of the amount of labor that is not being utilized.  Still, this is a useful 
exercise to gain some idea of the scale of the losses experienced by the economy from   16
labor market supply problems. 
  We divide losses into four categories.  One is excess labor being carried 
by firms that are avoiding firing workers.  We include in this category the extent 
to which employers are unable to dismiss workers whose productivity is low due to 
mismatch,  although  we  do  not  treat  them  separately.  The  second  is  losses  from  factors 
that may be increasing the extent of mismatch in the economy and thereby raising the 
natural rate of unemployment.  The third relates to women working part time and the 
fourth to women not working at all. 
 
10.1  Excess Labor 
It is difficult to know the extent to which firms are carrying excess labor.  MHLW 
in its quarterly Survey of the Labor Economy (Rōdō Keizai Dōkō Chōsa) reports the 
percentage of establishments surveyed that have surplus workers, as well as the 
percentage with labor shortages, for different industries and occupations.  These 
are useful for understanding cyclical conditions and how they differentially affect 
different parts of the labor market, but they give no real sense of the size of the 
problem. 
  Japanese firms carry some employees on their payrolls who are sent home for 
spells, often on a rotating basis, during downturns.  There are government subsidies 
in some cases to encourage firms to do this rather than dismiss the workers (Dore 
1986).  These individuals are picked up in the Labor Force Survey under a special 
category (kyūgyōsha) that includes all workers who are not at work on the survey day, 
including for illness or absenteeism.  Hashimoto (1993) notes that the number of 
kyūgyōsha moves counter-cyclically and that adjustment in their number is generally 
less important than adjustment in hours and inventory as aspects of company reactions 
to the business cycle.  The number of kyūgyōsha rose some 20% from 1989 to 2000, 
nowhere near the doubling of the unemployed.  The increase represents some 200,000 
employees, equal to 0.3% of total employment.  This is a reasonable lower bound for 
the number of surplus workers in Japanese firms. 
  An approach for setting an upper bound is to look at figures for total factor 
productivity growth and argue that slower TFP growth is due to labor hoarding during 
downturns.  The 1990s were undoubtedly a period of slower TFP growth, as was the mid 
1970s following the first oil shock.  Hayashi and Prescott (2002) calculate, after 
taking account of working hours, that TFP grew at 3.7% between 1983 and 1991 and then 
at only 0.5% between 1991 and 2000. They calculate that capital deepening increased 
during the 1990s from the 1980s, so it is unlikely that any drop in TFP growth could 
be attributed to a drop in the rate of investment. If all of the drop is attributed 
to excess labor being held in firms, we see a loss of 3.2% in the potential growth 
rate, assuming that this surplus labor could have been re-employed productively 
elsewhere. This is unlikely, as it would imply that almost a quarter of the labor 
force was surplus to firms’ needs by the end of the decade. 
  Still, if we assume that if firms were able to dismiss workers more easily, 
the economy could reach the OECD average for TFP growth per annum during 1979-97 of 
1.1%, then surplus labor kept in firms lowers TFP growth by up to 0.6% per year. (In 
practice the effect would be smaller because the reallocated labor would lose much 
of its job-specific human capital.)  This implies that the quantity of surplus labor 
currently is around 5% of the employed, about the same as the number of unemployed. 
This number often is quoted in press accounts, although it is unclear where reporters 
get their figures. We take it as the upper bound for the number of redundant workers   17
in Japanese firms. 
 
10.2  Skill Mismatch 
The problem of skills mismatch and the outward shift of the Beveridge curve was 
discussed  earlier.    The  Labor  White  Paper  for  2000,  uses  time  series  of  the 
unemployment  rate  and  the  vacancy  rate  to  estimate  that  the  natural  rate  of 
unemployment has risen from just over 2.0% to 3.5% since 1993 (MOL 2000c).  This is 
attributed mainly to structural change, particularly the decline in manufacturing, 
although aging of the work force is undoubtedly also part of the explanation.  Using 
the result of the Labor Ministry, we attribute a loss of 1.5% in overall labor input 
to the mismatch problem in the labor market. 
 
10.3  Female Labor Supply 
We measure losses from barriers to the supply of women’s labor as being losses from 
women working part time and from women not participating in the labor force at all.  
To  estimate  the  extent  to  which  labor  market  institutions  reduce  labor  force 
participation,  we  use  the  United  States  as  a  benchmark.  If  Japan  raised  the 
participation rate of women from its level of 67% to the US level of 77%, there would 
be an increase of about 15% in the female labor force input. 
  Japanese women put in around 136 hours per month, which is 82% of the 165 
hours averaged by men.  If employed Japanese women all worked as many hours as the 
men, they would increase their labor input by 21%.  This is grossly unrealistic 
because some of these women are young and attending school, many would prefer to stay 
home with small children even if child care is available, and many have household 
duties including caring for elderly relatives that take up much of their available 
time. However, it does serve as an upper bound for the effects of impediments that 
restrict hours of work.  A plausible lower bound for the effect of disincentives to 
working full-time comes from Higuchi (1995).  He estimates that married women who 
constrain their hours deliberately because of the tax and benefits system lower the 
overall labor input of women by 1.4%. 
  For our estimate of the contribution of impediments that encourage part-time 
work, we look at what would happen if the rate at which women 25 to 64 in Japan worked 
part-time was at the US level (20%) rather than its actual 42%.  (Women younger than 
25 are excluded because many are still in school.  Women over 64 are more likely to 
wish to work part-time regardless of impediments to working full-time.)  Japanese 
women 25 to 64 work about half as many hours as their full-time counterparts.  If 
50% of them worked full-time, this would increase the female labor input by roughly 
10%.
1 
  Adding the two effects (and compounding), gives a total increase in the labor 
input of women of 26.5%.  In terms of the overall labor force, this is an increase 
of around 11%. This figure is slightly smaller if adjusted for quality.  (Experience 
is an important component of quality, and on average female workers have less of it 
than male workers.) 
 
10.4  Overall Implications for Economic Growth 
                                                  
1 Computed as (share of women working part time) times (share of hours of full-time 
women worked by part-time women) times (share of women switching from part- to full- 
time work): 0.4 * 0.5 * 0.5 = 0.1.   18
Table 5 summarizes the calculations.  The results are intended to give some idea of 
how much of an impediment to economic growth the factors mentioned might be.  Output 
might  be  increased  by  between  9%  and  12%.  This  is  approximately  equal  to  a  1%  increase 
in  the  potential  growth  rate  of  the  economy  over  a  10-year  period.  This  is,  of  course, 
only a one-time benefit that the Japanese economy could exploit, but it is hardly 
a negligible one. 
  One question that naturally arises is why the impediments to the mobility 
of male employees that we examined have not been a problem in the past.  In fact, 
many of the institutions, including the strong protection of regular employees and 
the personnel management system, have previously been analyzed by many observers as 
great strengths (Koike 1988).  Our argument is that these institutions have been 
successful under the strong demand conditions that characterized the macroeconomy 
in Japan up to the 1990s, but they have not been successful under stagnant demand 
thereafter. 
  Aging of the work force also means that Japanese personnel practices are in 
need of reform, but change has been slow so far (Ariga and others 2000).  Under these 
conditions, institutions which were well-suited to a high-demand, moderate-rapid 
growth environment may become problematic. This is one area where better theoretical 
understanding of institutions under different growth environments is needed. 
 
 
11  Role of Government Policy 
 
Given that impediments to potential growth exist, how can government policy address 
them?  We are unable to quantify the extent to which government actions may be able 
to  address  the  issues  raised  here,  but  we  can  distinguish  those  areas  where  appropriate 
government policy should be able to increase effective labor inputs into the economy. 
  Table 6 provides a summary look at the role that government policy  could  play. 
Many of these policies are already being introduced or are under discussion in 
government deliberative councils.  Looking at the mobility of male employees, it is 
clear  that  government  legislation  can  change  the  nature  of  employment  protection  given 
employees.  If the costs of dismissal can be reduced for employers, then this should 
release labor for more productive use.  As suggested by Ohtake (2001), revision of 
the laws governing fixed-term employment should make it easier for employers to hire 
workers without making indefinite commitments to them.  Both of these actions will 
undermine some of the loyalty of employees toward the firm, but this must be weighed 
against the demoralization felt by many employees who are not contributing much to 
the output of their firm. 
  There is probably not much that government policy can do to change the nature 
of personnel management in the Japanese firm, although it can continue to promote 
the development of defined-contribution pension schemes.  In this area, government 
policy is moving in the right direction. 
  Barriers to mid-career hires are unlikely to be removed by government action. 
The prohibition of age limits in job advertisements is unlikely to have much effect 
on age discrimination, at least in the short run.  Subsidies to encourage mid-career 
employment have been tried in the past and are too blunt a tool: they may well be 
taken up by firms that plan to hire middle-aged and older workers anyway. The 
development of new career paths that can be entered by middle-aged men and women is 
something that firms will need to develop though their own action.  The government   19
may be able to play a useful role, however, by leading through example in its own 
employment policies. 
  The government is working at improving information provision in the labor 
market, but continued deregulation of the employment-placement industry should help 
to change the environment.  The government can play a leading role in the development 
of a more open environment for information through example, by making its own 
activities more transparent. 
  Much is already being done by the government to promote family-friendly 
policies at firms and to develop day-care provision so that women can remain at work.  
The  government  is  contemplating  major  reform  of  the  income  tax  system  that  will  abolish 
many of the features that discourage women from participating or working longer hours 
(Asahi Shimbun, 16 May 2002). 
 
 
12  Conclusion 
 
This paper has examined a number of personnel practices, laws, and regulations that 
lower the supply of labor in Japan.  Broadly, there are two kinds of impediments, 
those that restrict the movement of labor between firms, and those that discourage 
women from participating to a greater extent.  There has been a symmetric lack of 
information between employers and job seekers, and this is almost certainly due to 
the poor development of the external labor market in an economy with overall low 
mobility.  After a worker is over 30 it has been quite difficult to find attractive 
job opportunities. This is especially true for women re-entering the labor force. 
For  married  women,  barriers  also  include  disincentives  in  the  tax  system  and  the  dearth 
of meaningful work, especially for women re-entering the labor force after rearing 
children.  Despite  changes, further modifications  in  the legal structure  and  practices 
of Japan's employment system are necessary to facilitate the diversifying patterns 
of employment and work attitudes of both men and women.  Using other OECD countries 
and especially the United States as a benchmark, we estimate that removal of these 
barriers would increase the productive labor supply in Japan by 13% to 18% and thus 
could raise the potential growth rate of the Japanese economy by roughly 1% a year 
over a 10-year period. 
  There are a number of empirical and theoretical areas where further work is 
needed.  First, we need to know more about the real extent of surplus labor within 
firms. This requires more detailed surveys of individual firms than have been carried 
out.  Second, regarding mid-career hires and their pay, research is needed beyond 
the qualitative studies done by the government, especially concerning actual pay 
levels.  Longitudinal data on individuals are needed to see who manages to make a 
mid-career move successfully.  Third, further research in the area of labor market 
problems and social norms would help us better understand why such features such as 
egalitarian pay norms and firm-size differentials are more persistent than others. 
  A better theoretical understanding of the way in which institutions that 
function well during periods of normal or rapid growth may become liabilities when 
growth  is  stagnant  is  especially  important.  The  role  of  the  family  and  of  state  policy, 
and their effect on female labor supply during periods of rapid social change, needs 
to be better understood.  This could be usefully looked at in an international 
comparative  perspective,  especially  southern  European  countries  where  women  also  have 
had  less  of  a  role  in  the  labor  market  in  the  past  but  are  now  increasing  participation.   20
  Although changes to overcome some of the barriers, such as the poor provision 
of information in the labor market, are being promoted by government and business 
leaders, many other changes require broader transformation of the Japanese economy.  
As Noguchi (1995) has pointed out, Japanese economic policy is still based to a large 
extent on the premise that much of the security and welfare of individuals in the 
economy will be provided through their employers.  Japanese labor law (as developed 
through case law), industrial policy, and financial regulation have been based on 
this assumption. 
  Policy makers and regulators in areas other than labor will need to change 
their  approach  for  the  full  benefits  of  any  change  in  labor  regulations  to  be  realized.  
The large-scale restructuring that is required if Japan is to continue to shift away 
from manufacturing and reduce the size of its construction industry also requires 
a shift toward increasing provision of security through private or state-provided 
insurance.  This in turn may have the effect of introducing a different set of 
inefficiencies, including an increased rate of unemployment and earlier retirement.  
Policies will need to be designed carefully if this kind of outcome is to be avoided.   21
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40.8  I exceed the age limit of the job postings 
23.4  My  work  experience  is  not  transferable  to  the  general  society 
21.8  Returns to seniority will be lost and I will suffer wage loss 
19.1  I do not know how to look for jobs 
14.1  I will lose personal contacts established through my work 
13.5  I will suffer a loss in my pension 
 
 













33.8  Older workers lack physical endurance 
26.9  Older workers require higher wages 
24.9  Occupational skills do not match firm(s expectations 
23.8  Desire to maintain a young work force 
20.2  To restrict number of job applicants 
14.9  Older workers do not mix well with younger workers 
12.9  Older workers are hard to handle 
9.9  Older workers do not adapt well to corporate culture 
8.8  To avoid exceeding the age structure of previous hires 
6.7  Older workers lack motivation 
5.7  Relative ease of hiring young workers 
4.8  No posts for older workers and cannot accommodate them 
3.0  Because other firms impose age limits 
 
Source: Japan Institute of Labour 2001a 
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Table 3 
Female Labor Force Participation and Part-time Employment, 






59.6  39.4  Japan 
76.4  21.4  Sweden 
70.8  18.2  United States 
68.9  40.8  United Kingdom 
63.2  33.9  Germany 
61.7  24.3  France 
46.2  23.4  Italy 
 
 
1 Percentage of females ages 15-64 in the labor force. 
2 Part-time  female  workers  as  a  percentage  of  all  female  workers.  Part-time  is  defined 
as less than 30 hours per week except Japan where it is less than 35 hours per week.  
 









*2  Reason for adjusting annual income 
    
35.7  49.1  Any reason 
    
30.0  27.8  To avoid paying income tax
3 
23.5  32.6  To  avoid  exceeding  tax  exempt  and  special  tax  exempt  status  for  spouses 
    
12.0  15.7  To receive fringe benefits from spouse's employer 
11.5  30.5  So health insurance and pension covered by spouse 
0.8  1.4  So spouse's employer will not find out that I am working 
    
2.0  7.5  To avoid paying unemployment insurance 
 
Multiple answers were allowed 
1 General Survey on Part-time Workers Condition conducted by the Ministry of Labor, 
taken from Higuchi 1995. 
2 Recruit Works Institute, 2001b. 
3 The General Survey also asked this question in two other forms. "I plan in advance 
so that my annual income will not exceed (1 million" (which is the usual tax 
exemption) was checked by 16.2% of respondents and "I adjust my work patterns 
throughout the year so that my annual income will not exceed (1 million" by 13.8%. 
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Table 5 
Effect on Labor Input and Economic Output from Changes in the Labor Market 
 
(percents) 
Labor Input  Economic Output
2  Factor 
0.3-5.0  0.2-3.5  Reduce excess labor held by firms 
1.5  1.1  Reduce skill mismatch 
4.1  2.9  Increase women(s hours1 
6.2  4.3  Increase women(s participation1 
    
12.8-17.5  9.0-12.2  Total
3 
 
As explained in the test, these are one-time effects that would be spread out over 
several years. 
1 Computed by multiplying the figures in the text by the proportion of women in the 
labor force (41%). 
2 Computed as the increase in labor input (column 1) times labor(s share of output 
(70%). 
3 The  effect  of  the  two  contributions  concerned  with  women  are  compounded  in 





Government Policies to Reduce Labor Market Impediments to Growth 
 
Labor market problem 
 




Legislation to reduce the cost of dismissals 
 
Seniority pay structures and 






Encourage defined-contribution plans 
 
Information problems in the job 
market 
 
Further deregulation of the employment-placement 
industry 
 
Barriers to mid-career hires 
 
Lead by example in the public sector 
 
Government tax and benefit 
policies that discourage female 
labor supply 
 
Abolish the exemption for dependent spouses and 
reform the benefit system to encourage greater 
participation of women 
 
Female career interruptions 
during child-bearing years 
Encourage family-friendly workplaces with day-care 
provision  and  re-employment  for  women  who  take  short 
career breaks 























































SOURCE: International Labor Organization 1999, data for Japan taken from Ministry 




















* Part-time employees refer to workers with less than 35 working hours per week. 
 